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The “OPS” of Running the Football? (Lamar Still the Best)

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JK Dobbins running against the Steelers
Joey Pulone/Baltimore Ravens
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Reading Time: 19 minutes

Ravens Pass-Catchers Through 13 Games (and some other stuff)

Would you believe that The Play Of The Game was a three-yard gain on first down?

Ravens-Steelers matchups always feature unexpected moments of drama. This one came after Ravens starting QB Tyler Huntley got knocked out of the game and Steelers backup QB Mitchell Trubisky had shown he could drive his team from the Pittsburgh 11 all the way to the front of the goal, before Marcus Williams dramatically intercepted him. But that left the Ravens backed-up on their own one, with a hungry Steelers pass rush eager to make a play, and the Pittsburgh crowd in full-throated roar.

Out comes Ravens undrafted rookie free-agent quarterback Anthony Brown, to take his very first NFL regular season snap, standing in his own end zone. This had all the ingredients of potential disaster: a safety, maybe even a fumble recovered in the end-zone for a defensive touchdown. I could barely watch.

Brown was as cool as a cucumber. As cool as the other side of the pillow. He executed either a play-fake, or it was an RPO all the way, and pivoted to find Demarcus Robinson for a short out. I could not friggin BELIEVE that he chose to throw in that situation: but he put the ball right on his guy. Remember he & Robinson had hooked-up in Robinson’s first Ravens work in preseason; I guess they have a connection.

That play got the Ravens out of their own end zone. On the next play, J.K. Dobbins ripped off 11 yards. They stalled immediately after that – Brown’s next pass was incomplete – but the desperate emergency was over. They got out to the 16-yard-line, then were pushed back to the 12 when Brown was sacked by TJ Watt. Still, Jordan Stout was able to punt with his feet outside the end zone. The Steelers got the ball back on their own 32 (after the punt and a holding call): field position adequately flipped. Crisis averted.

That was probably the Steelers’ best chance to win the game. The Ravens were tap dancing on a tight rope over Disaster Canyon. Brown got them safely across. If he had made no other plays at all on the day, I’d give him a game ball just for that five-play sequence.

With 42 rushes for 215 yards on the day; with the defense getting three interceptions and two sacks, plus knocking the opposing starter out of the game; this was a game-plan that emphasized toughness and poise. It was NOT a day for demonstrating passing excellence. Indeed, it looks like I made a mistake choosing to write a column that focuses on the Ravens pass-catchers, huh?  ???? Just 11 catches on the day!

But sometimes passing “excellence” is making small, timely plays in clutch situations.  And sometimes passing excellence is just about what doesn’t happen. Preventing disaster. The safety that wasn’t; the sack-fumble that doesn’t happen. Those were as important to this win as any of the big runs and interceptions.

What can Brown do for you?

The Ravens are a little screwed this week with Huntley’s time in concussion protocol, because it’s a short week; they play at Cleveland on Saturday, not Sunday. That has to make it a little more likely that Huntley will be unavailable for the game – although he did participate in Tuesday’s walk-through and had his helmet on at practice Wednesday – which would give Brown the start. What would that mean?

You gotta figure the game plan will look a lot like the plan for the Steelers did, whichever quarterback starts. Cleveland can rush the passer (Myles Garrett is a monster), but they are not good against the run – dead last in defensive EPA-per-play.

When the Ravens played them earlier this season, they rushed 44 times for 160 yards. Gus Edwards & Lamar Jackson & Justice Hill were all over 75% Success Rate. Brown is probably about as good a “reader” and decision-maker in the option game as Huntley is; that’s the kind of game his college team played at Oregon, so he should be extremely familiar with all those concepts. A very experienced college quarterback, who was a 5th-year senior (three years at BC and two at Oregon).  When the QB has to pull the ball and run, Huntley is faster than Brown (Huntley ran 4.5 in the 40 vs Brown’s 4.7). But Brown can pick up some yards – you might remember him scoring a touchdown in preseason on a red zone scramble when his receivers were all covered. On that play he outraced the defense to the pylon.

What about when the Ravens have to throw it?

Brown does not have Huntley’s accuracy, but he’s also not the pure checkdown artist that Huntley is. In preseason, Brown attacked the middle and deep areas. You might remember him as the guy who threw the passes that made Robinson look like an All-Pro the week the Ravens acquired him. Here’s a great look at some plays from Brown in preseason:

I was impressed with Brown at the time. I actually liked him as a prospect in preseason slightly more than I liked Huntley. Huntley is way more polished and ready, but Brown seemed to have more tactical aggressiveness, and a bigger arm. He looked rusty as hell against Pittsburgh, and his throws were behind the receivers. But he made very good reads and good decisions.

With a full week of practice to get sharp, Brown might prove shockingly capable. He could even spark a mild “backup-QB controversy”. Probably though, Brown is not “ready”.  He took a sack by Watt where he seemed to have no idea how fast his clock needed to be. Garrett isn’t any more forgiving.

But Brown has some real traits & skills. I think he could provide a pleasant surprise.

Return to fourth down

Fourth-down decisions were a big talking point back in weeks four and five of the season, but the topic has faded the last couple months. No one seems to be talking about 4th downs this week, and I’m mildly surprised by that. Of course, (1) the Ravens won, and (2) the quarterback situation is a huge focus for fans right now (as it should be), so I guess there’s not much oxygen left for a 4th-down “controversy”. But I think it’s worth taking a look at. Harbaugh made three extremely interesting 4th-down decisions this week.

And one of them I strongly disagreed with.

One:

The first of the striking 4th-down decisions came early, about the 8:00 mark of the first quarter, with the Ravens on their own 34-yard line, facing 4th-&-inches. The TV announcers called it an “aggressive” move that Harbaugh could make because he had confidence in his offensive line and in his defense. I had a complete opposite impression of the move. I felt that if Harbs had been confident in any of that, he would have punted. This struck me as a move made out of fear. But it’s a paradoxical kind of fear: not a fear of getting stopped, but a fear of opportunity cost.

Harbs is playing his second-string quarterback, on the road in the most hostile environment for Ravens teams, against a defense featuring one of the most disruptive pass-rushers in the league in Watt. Huntley has a lot of virtues, but he is the smallest of small-armed dink-&-dunk quarterbacks. When the Steelers D really gets rolling, we’ve seen them eat the small-armed passers alive. I believe Harbs felt that he would have very few opportunities to sustain drives on Sunday. Here he faced “and inches”; one of the most makeable fourth downs he was likely to get on the whole day. If he punted here, when we he get as good an opportunity to keep a drive alive? If he punted here, do the Steelers score first and force the Ravens to play from behind? Can the Ravens be successful playing from behind in Pittsburgh, without Lamar?

The risk if you don’t convert is high because of the field position. But the risk that you don’t convert is fairly low, because it was “and inches”. I believe Harbs saw this as an early game-losing inflection point, and was determined to keep the initiative.

“Fear” usually keeps NFL coaches from going for it on 4th down. It’s interesting to see a situation where “fear” motivates in the exact opposite direction.

The automated “4th-down decision bot” on Twitter had this one as a toss-up; but that bot uses a purely game-theory model that is extremely aggressive. The bot is consistently more aggressive than other ones I’ve seen. What I’m saying is, if that bot had it as a toss-up, then others probably had it as a slight lean toward punting.

Huntley executed a QB sneak, and easily got a pleasantly drama-free first down. The Ravens would go on to score on that drive, getting down to the Steelers 24 where Justin Tucker hit a Field Goal for a 3-0 lead. Back in Week 4, I moaned that none of these “right” 4th-down decisions that Harbaugh was consistently making were actually paying off for the Ravens. This one did. Playing from ahead is always a massive advantage, more so on a day like Sunday when the defenses were ascendant over the offenses. They owe the lead to that 4th-down decision.

Two:

The second notable 4th-down decision came the 11:40 mark of the 2nd quarter with the Ravens up 10-7. Kenny Pickett had been knocked out of the game and Trubisky had immediately demonstrated that he is a ton more prepared and professional, driving the Steelers 65 yards in six plays for a quick touchdown. The Ravens had driven to the Steelers 34 and faced 4th-&-1. This was an opportunity to settle the game down, with the Steelers feeling like momentum was on their side. If you make the score 13-7, then you could give up a touchdown and still have the chance to go into halftime with the lead by getting another field goal. That was exactly the reasoning we used in talking about the Bengals game Week 5, when Harbs chose to take the points.

The aggressive 4th-down bot said to go for it, calling it a medium-strong recommendation:

But! Look at the bot’s estimate of the chance of making the field goal! The bot is assessing the FG as being a 62% make, and that’s an important input into its decision-model. If the field goal is less likely, that would make the win probability of the kick lower, which would indicate further toward a “go for it” situation. If the field goal is more likely, that would improve the win probability of the “kick it” option, bringing it up toward (maybe past?) the go-for-it option.

The model doesn’t know that we have Justin mothafucken Tucker kicking the field goal. Do you really buy that Tucker’s chance of making that kick was only 62%?  Shit. I mean, I’m not saying that I’d bet the mortgage on it. But 62? Tucker? From the 34-yard line, it would be about a 52-yard attempt. Do you seriously sweat any attempt by Tucker from below 55? I mean, I know shit happens and all. But 62%? On his career, Tucker is 19 of 22 from 50 to 59 yards: 86%.

Now: Pittsburgh is a windy stadium. Maybe Tucker told Harbs in pre-game that kicking to that direction in the stadium his range would be lower. Fine: if that’s what the professionals discussed, then I am way off base here  But absent any evidence:

  1. I have a damn hard time buying that 62% is the right success-expectation for Tucker from that distance.
  2. So the model is wrong because its input on the Field Goal likelihood is way wrong. It should be medium-strong to kick, not to go.
  3. Forget the damn model: you’ve got a fired-up stadium and you can bring in Tucker to restore order and keep it within a FG even if they get a TD.

Harbaugh’s decision to go was, to my mind, the wrong decision for the game situation. I was shaking my head and cussing.  This is the only one of Harbs’ aggressive 4th-down calls in the past two seasons that I have strongly felt was the wrong decision. There have been others where I was wide-eyed and fearful, but I got it. I could see the logic. But this one I really disagreed with.

As you know it failed in spectacular fashion: aborted snap, loss of one. The Pittsburgh offense took over, even more fired up than they were before. They immediately drove down into the red zone; only Roquan Smith’s spectacular interception saved the day.  It shouldn’t have come to that.

Three:

The third notable 4th-down decision came at the 7:26 mark of the 3rd quarter with the Ravens up 13-7. They had the ball on the Steelers’ side of midfield, and faced 4th-&-1 at the Steelers 46. The model calls it a fairly strong “go for it” situation; and it’s in that area of the field where almost all of the aggressive coaches do choose to go for it.

But Harbs elected to punt! That seemed surprising. After two very aggressive calls, Harbs pulled back in a fairly standard go-for-it situation. I didn’t have a strong feeling that it was wrong; but I was a little surprised.

This one has a very straight-forward explanation. We know now that Huntley was being evaluated for concussion, and in fact would not return to the game. That explains the decision to punt. Tough to be aggressive in your 4th-down play-calling when you’re not sure your quarterback is available.

As it happened, Jordan Stout and the coverage unit made a great special teams play, pinning the Steelers to their 11-yard line. Nice job. (The ensuing drive would lead to the situation where Anthony Brown stepped into the fire, bringing the column full circle.)

(By the way, notice that the decision bot has zero for its estimate of the likelihood of a successful Field Goal from there.  ????  Really? Zero? Have you met Justin Tucker? I mean, I wouldn’t advocate sending him out there in that situation. But I sure as hell ain’t giving him a zero percent chance of making it if they did send him out there. That’s crazy.)

The 4th-down calls were a rich subplot to an exciting game.

Here are your receiving stats for the Steelers game – but this was not a game about stats. This was a game about toughness and resilience and playing smart; about defense and running the football. The Ravens won because they played tougher and smarter than the Steelers did; they defended better and ran the ball a shit-ton better. So, we’ll look at the stats because that’s what we do; but these stats are more beside-the-point than usual.

I think DeSean Jackson has led the team in yards-per-target every game he’s played. You can’t play him 50 snaps a game: at his age, he wouldn’t hold up, he’d be unavailable when you need him in January. But he makes an important contribution.  He’s like a zone-busting shooting guard, who comes off the bench and hits three quick three-pointers to pull the opposing defense out of their zone and make them guard you man-to-man. Or maybe a pinch-hitter who gets a key late-inning double with runners in scoring position. He’s a great asset IF you use him sparingly. As the Ravens have done.

Robinson had a quietly impressive game. The only incomplete was thrown by Brown toward the end of the third quarter. That was the play where Brown threw long but the receiver ran short. Second and nine, Robinson split wide left. The corner on him gives a six or seven-yard cushion and retreats so he’s sitting right on top of Robinson’s route, so Robinson cuts out at about 15 yards. Brown throws it deep, about 25-30 yards. Harmless, one of those times where announcers say the QB and receiver were “not on the same page.”  Other than that Robinson caught every damn thing thrown his way, his highlight being the 23-yard catch-&-run that on the drive that culminated in Tucker’s first Field Goal of the game.

The only target to Duvernay came from Brown, with about nine minutes left in the game. The pass was over-the-middle and behind Duve, who tipped it dangerously up in the air and for a moment it seemed like the ball might be intercepted. Steelers corner #23 Damontae Kazee just missed the diving snag. The drive continued, and culminated in Tucker’s game-clinching field goal. The Ravens also used Duve productively as a decoy on the goal line: Huntley faked the flip to Duvernay on the jet motion before handing to Dobbins for the touchdown run.

I’m sure you want to know, what is the story with Duvernay’s season? Well, if you’re playing the follow-the-column drinking game, it’s time to take a shot: I’m going to talk about Rashod Bateman again. Bateman was lost to the Ravens for the season during game eight. The first seven games of the season, Bateman was in-&-out of the lineup: he missed games five and six.

Here’s a breakdown of Duvernay in those games, with Bateman & without:

After Bateman went down, Robinson took over primary duties as the “X” receiver. Here’s Robinson & Duvernay from game number eight on:

Duvernay is a super-useful complementary receiver. Also, he’s an All-Pro return-man, which is worth a spot on the roster by itself, and he’s very dangerous on jet sweeps. A Swiss-army-knife player; probably the Ravens should also use him for gimmicky stuff in the red zone, in addition to what they’ve got him doing now. But Duve does not have a “complete” wide receiver game. His route-running is a little stiff, and he doesn’t separate from coverage well to create easy throws for his quarterback.

He’s what fans would call a “quality #2” or #3, but he is miscast as a 1.

A new stat for rushers?

The last two columns (here and here) I talked a lot about Success Rate for Running Backs. That seems like a convenient backdrop. If there isn’t a lot to talk about in the receiving game, how about we review RB Success Rates from the game?

Remember, a run is scored a “success” if:

  1. On first down: gain 40% of the yards-to-go for a “success”. So e.g., a four-yard gain on 1st-&-10.
  2. On second down, gain 60% of the yards-to-go for a “success.” So a six-yard gain on 2nd-&-10, or a three-yard gain on 2nd-&-5.
  3. On third down (or on fourth down), convert the first down for a “success;” anything else isn’t.

Fumbles aren’t “successes” no matter how many yards were gained before the ball hit the turf. (A touchdown is always a success.)

 

That last column needs explanation.  I was wondering to myself, as a Stat Boy: what is a smart way to sort that list above?  What order should the players be in?

Usually NFL stats for rushers are sorted by total yards. This column pushes efficiency stats, so sorting by total yards is right out. We’ve been sorting the pass-catchers by yards-per-target for two years now, so yards-per-carry seems an obvious, viable choice. But it’s weird to spend two weeks harping on the value of Success Rate, and then not use it at all when I finally put up a rushing box score.

So I invented a new “combined score”, which is just the product of (yards-per-carry avg) x SuccessRate. So in the table above, Dobbins gets 8 x .8 = 6.4. Gus gets 5 x .69 which is around 3.5. Pancake Pat gets 100% of 2. Huntley gets 37.5% of 3.75, which looks interesting just because all the sig-figs are the same, but the number comes out to around 1.4. Kenyan Drake gets 0% of 1.

I’m a little bit defensive about “inventing” a new number. First of all, the absolute LAST thing the football analytics world needs is a new stat for Running Backs. We’ve got DVOA, we’ve got Expected-Points-Added per carry, yadda-yadda-yadda.  The ground is well-covered, and this number very unsophisticated by comparison.

Second of all, I don’t really believe in “master stats.” In general, I find that when analysts try to gather up all relevant info into one Master Stat for ranking players, too much information gets lost.

For example, I am a huge critic of PFF’s “WAR” stat. (my angry attempt at a take-down of it is here). A “composite score” of yards-per-carry and Success Rate stinks of the kind of “master stat” thinking that I don’t agree with.

Third of all, I didn’t invent Success Rate: Aaron Schatz of Football Outsiders did, almost 20 years ago. So I didn’t do any of the intellectual underpinnings of a “new number.” I feel like I don’t have “standing” to tout a new master stat.

However.

There is a big difficulty with the advanced rushing stats like DVOA & EPA etc: you can’t calculate them yourself. They both depend on a big database of games. DVOA is calculated off the play-by-play data of all the other games in the league that year. EPA is based on the statistical analysis of thousands of games, to determine what points are “expected” from a typical down & distance & field position & time remaining. You just can’t do it yourself. (Heck: DVOA is proprietary. You really can’t do it yourself.) Whereas yards-per-carry is something you can get out of any box score of the game. And Success Rate is something you can do yourself, just by going over the play-by-play. The play-by-play is available either from the gamebook on NFL.com (here is the one for the Steelers game) or the game page on PFR the next day (here).  It’s a little laborious, you have to look at every carry. But it’s doable by an amateur, with only the info for one single game.

(Footnote: PFR is even better than I realized. For every play, they have columns on their play-by-play showing “Expected Points Before” and “Expected Points After”. The difference is the Expected Points Added; so you actually could do “EPA” -type analysis on rushers using publicly available data. Hats-off to PFR!)

Once you have both stats, yards-per-carry and Success Rate, combining them is very similar to OPS in baseball, on-base + slugging.  That started out as a nerd concept and now it’s an official stat. It’s the default listing for team offense on the MLB stat page! (Who down with OBP? Every last homie!) In this comparison, yards-per-carry is sort of like slugging pct., and Success Rate is like on-base pct. You can’t add them like OPS, since one of them is a fraction, so we multiply them.

Conceptually it’s like asking, what percent of your yards-per-carry average does your Success Rate let you “keep”?

Last year’s NFL average yards-per-carry was 4.3. The Football Outsiders glossary entry for Success Rate says that “A running back above 50% is very consistent; below 40% is very inconsistent,” which implies 45% as a midpoint. Taking those two values, (4.3 ypc) x (45% Success Rate) gives a 1.935 “combo”. Two is easier to remember, and it’s very close to the number you get when both values are “45”:  4.5 ypc x 45% gives 2.025.

So I’m going to arbitrarily say that a “combo” score of 2+ is above average, and below 2 is meh.

The 120 yards Dobbins put up Sunday is the Ravens’ highest yardage total by one player in a game this season, narrowly edging out the 119 Lamar put up against the Dolphins and Drake put up against the Giants. Dobbins’ high yards-per-carry for the game and very high success rate give him a high “combined” score. He is Football Outsiders #1 back for the week by “rushing only” (i.e. not including receptions).

But his day doesn’t crack the Ravens top 5 best “combo” scores this season.  As you might expect, Lamar owns the top three spots:

Here are the full rushing stats for the season.  Guess who leads the team – ?

Yeah, that’s not really in question. One mild surprise for me is how good Hill has been by this metric. That matches the eye test – he has looked very effective just about every time he touches the ball – but he’s really flown under-the-radar. It’s nice to see a fairly smart stat that bubbles him up the list.

Mark Andrews and Ricard have absurdly high Success Rates, and extremely low yards-per-carry numbers. That reflects how they’re used as rushers: picking up the first down on 3rd-&-1 and 4th-&-1. No chance for a high yards-per-carry avg, but the Success Rate tells the tale.

Drake is the only one among the regular rushers whose Success Rate is below 55%. He’s below 45%! That captures how inconsistent he’s been. Sometimes he looks amazing, like in the Giants game (he also had nice games against the Bengals and Buccaneers). But he gets stopped for losses a lot.

Huntley’s “combo” score is a surprise. It’s about average; but if you think about it that’s quite bad, because quarterback rushing is one of the most efficient & productive runs around the league. No QB should have “league average” rushing efficiency. Huntley’s touchdown came on a two-yard run, so you might think that “unfairly” lowers his yards-per-carry. But take out that run and he’s at 4.06 yards-per, 47.1% Success, for a combo of 1.91. That’s not better. I haven’t really noticed that Huntley is particularly bad as a rusher. I noticed he wasn’t Lamar, but I figured that was an unfair standard and Huntley was probably “fine.” Now I’m going to watch more closely.

Mike Davis has been cut, which is unsurprising.

So there you go: a new – well, not really “new”: in fact, highly derivative – stat for rushers. Just an easy way to combine yards-per-carry average and Success Rate.

The only thing this stat needs is a catchy name!  (“Combo” isn’t it.)

And another thing about Greg Roman – !

I kinda went off on the topic of Greg Roman last week; I really didn’t mean to devote as much space to it as I did. My plan was to leave the subject alone this week. But then I saw something on Twitter that really surprised me.

This shouldn’t have been a surprise. We were aware of all the pieces of that. But I had never put it together mentally.

— Ronnie Stanley and Rashod Bateman have both played in the same game once, plus 13 snaps the following week.

Game 7 this season vs the Browns, Stanley made his third start of the season and Bateman returned from missing two games with a foot injury.  Bateman caught four of five targets for 8.4 yards-per in a Ravens win. The following week he got hurt on his 13th snap against the Bucs, and was done for the season.

— In the three seasons since Dobbins was drafted, he & Stanley have both played in a game just nine times (out of a possible 47).

In 2020 Stanley got hurt, and played a total of six games. Dobbins was active in those games, but then Dobbins missed all of 2021. This season they have both been active in games five and six, and this past Sunday.

Think about what that means. Who are the most important Ravens on offense, the cornerstone or foundation players, by a combination of accomplishment (All-Pro’s) and investment?

— Lamar Jackson: All-Pro, 1st-rd pick, currently playing on a 5th-year option for $32.4M (incl bonus).

— Mark Andrews: All-Pro, currently playing on 5-yr / $60M contract with the most fully-guaranteed money of any Tight End.

— Ronnie Stanley: All-Pro, 1st-rd pick, currently playing on 6-yr / $111M contract with the most fully-guaranteed money of any Left Tackle.

— Rashod Bateman: 1st-rd pick.

— JK Dobbins: 2nd-rd pick.

Right? That’s the core group of playmakers that the Ravens have planned to build their offense on these past couple seasons. All-Pros and first-rounders. Technically Dobbins was taken in the second, but when you think about the way modern NFL teams have gotten religion about not using 1st-round picks on Running Backs, I think it makes sense to view a second-round RB as kind of a first-rd pick, in a way.

So: All-Pros and first-rounders.

This is absolutely classic offense-building for any era of football. It’s good for Andy Reid and the Kansas City Chiefs: it’s the same positional planning that gave them Patrick Mahomes & Travis Kelce & Orlando Brown Jr. & Tyreek Hill & Clyde Edwards-Helaire.  nd it’s good for the 1990s Cowboys: you got your playmaking “triplets” like Troy Aikman & Michael Irvin & Emmitt Smith, plus field-stretching Tight End like Jay Novacek (Andrews is better) and the line-anchoring Left Tackle like Larry Allen.  Difference-makers at each spot. Hell, it would be good for John Madden and the 1970s Raiders: Kenny Stabler, Dave Casper, Art Shell, Cliff Branch, with the Running Back Mark van Eeghen as the only one not in the Hall of Fame. It’s hard to overstate how tried-&-true-blue that alignment of top-notch offensive talent is. You put Pro Bowl4-caliber players in those five spots, your offense is humming.

That Ravens group has NEVER taken the field together. Not in one single game. Not ever.

Think about that. Collectively that group has missed 72 man-games this season and last, which is about 42%. Almost half.   (That math is fudgy: I’ve already included the rest of this season for Bateman, though it hasn’t been played yet. The real number could easily wind up being higher.)

The Ravens have built & planned around a specific group of offensive personnel, and their Offensive Coordinator has never ever got to use it. Instead he’s had to stitch-together solutions and make-do, without ever having all his weapons. And honestly he’s been doing a pretty creditable job of it. The Ravens are currently 11th in points-per-drive, and 6th in offensive DVOA (11th pass, 2nd rush).

For those who want Roman fired; again, what would we be firing him for? How many offenses excel when their All-Pros and first-rounders are taken away? How do we pronounce the offensive system as “failed”, without ever seeing it with all its parts? At least one time. That’s still a hella exciting group – look at the way Dobbins dominated when he and Stanley came back this Sunday. Each of those players has produced individually in this offense. Getting them all together should be quite something, if we ever get to see it.

One thing I will say, and this is more an Eric DeCosta criticism than a Roman criticism. The Ravens would probably be the 1-seed right now, if they had drafted George Pickens in the second round this year instead of David Ojabo. Oof. That one hurts a little. I’m trying to maintain the long view: a few years ago I felt the same way about JuJu Smith-Schuster versus Tyus Bowser, and that has turned out to be better than I initially thought. This one could too. But right now it’s hard.

According to the Football Outsiders Playoff Odds, the Ravens are 98% to make the playoffs, 61% to win the division, 42% slotted as the 3-seed, and have the 7th-best chance to win the Super Bowl. The 538 NFL Predictions are almost exactly the same; 62% to win the division, and with the 6th-best chance to win the Super Bowl (FO has the Niners above the Ravens, and 538 has them below.)

That’s all extremely positive for what has at times felt like a tough, rugged season.

Next Up: Divisional road game! The Ravens travel to Cleveland to face the Brownies in a Saturday game (not Sunday).

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